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THE REPORT OF TI-IE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK 
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 11: AN UPDATE* 
Stephen B. Burbankt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
My goal in this article is to provide a fairly complete sum­
mary of the work of the Third Circuit Task Force1 on Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 1 ,2 anticipating some of the questions 
* © 1989 Stephen B. Burbank 
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The author was the reporter of 
the Task Force and principal author of its report .  This text is adapted from re­
marks delivered to the Third Circuit .Judicial Conference on September 19, 1988. 
They introduced a program, put together by  a committee chaired by .Judge Sarokin, 
that was devoted entirelv to the work of the Task Force, which was then reflected in 
a discussion draft. Foll
,
owing the Conference, and in the light of the discussion 
there and other comments received , the report was revised. It  has now been pub­
lished by, and is available  from, the American Judicature Society.  See RuLE II IN 
TRANSITION: THE REPORT or THE THIRD CIRCUIT TAsK FoRCE ON FEDERAL RuLE or 
CIVIL PROCEDURE I I ( !989). 
It is important to acknowledge the extraordinarv efforts of the district court 
clerks and their s talls, led by iV!ike Kunz of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and 
of Sal l y  Mrvos ,  the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, and her staff, who were instru­
mental in the col lection of the most important empirical data. 
1 The members of the Task Force were: 
Honorable John P. Fullam, Chair 
Professor Stephen B. Burbank, Reporter 
Alice W. Ballard, Esq. 
Honorable Alan N .  Bloch 
Edmund N. Carpenter, II, Esq. 
Barry H. Garfinkel, Esq. 
Professor A. Leo Levin 
S. Gerald Litvin, Esq. 
W. Thomas iVIcGough, Jr., Esq. 
David H. Marion, Esq 
Melvil le  D. Mil ler, Jr., Esq. 
Robert G. Rose. Esq. 
Professor Linda Jov Silberman 
Wil l iam K. Slate, II, Esq. 
Jerold S. Solovv, Esq. 
Henry vV. Sa\\·yer. IlL Esq. 
Richard J Seidel, Esq. 
In addition, Chiefjudge Gibbons, who appointed the Task Force, \\·as an acti\c 
participant in its discussions . .Judge Gibbons' retirement from the Third Circuit is 
the bench's loss and Seton Halt Lt\\' School's gain. 
2 As amended in 1983 and , to make it gender neutral, in 1987, Rule 11 
pro\'ides: 
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readers of its report may have as well as highlighting some of the 
more difficult choices we faced. I will not be able to cover all of 
the territory, including in particular all of our empirical findings. 
I hope, however, that by the end of this piece the reader will have 
a good sense not only of what we recommend but of why we rec­
ommend it. 
The goals of the 1988 Third Circuit Judicial Conference 
were to stimulate discussion and knowledge about a legal topic of 
great controversy and to focus attention on the matters treated in 
the discussion draft generated by the Task Force and on those 
matters that were not, but should have been, treated there.3 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 
The report contains, in the text, almost an equal mix of the 
normative and the empirical, and it may be useful to explain why 
it was written in this manner. We could have confined ourselves 
to the collection and analysis of empirical data and to recommen­
dations supported by such data. That certainly would have 
marked a change in discourse about Rule 1 1, which has tended to 
SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AN D OTHER PAPERS; 
SANCTIONS 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by  
an attorney shall be signed by at leas t one at torney of  record in the at­
torney's individual name, whose address shall be s tated. A party who is 
not represented by an attorney shal l  sign the party's p leading, motion, 
or other paper and s tate the party's address. Excep t  when o t herwise 
speciftcally provided by rule or s tatute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit .  The ruie in equity that  the averments of  an 
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses 
or of  one witness sus tained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.  
The signature of  an attorney or party cons titutes a certificate by  the 
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion. or o ther paper; 
that to the bes t of the signer's knowledge. information, and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grout�decl in fact  and is war­
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modi­
fication, or reversal of existing law, and that i t  is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cos t  of  litigation. If a pleading, m otion, or 
o ther paper is not signed, i t  shall be s tricken unless it is signed prompt ly  
after the omission is  called to the attention of the pleader or movant .  I f  
a pleading. motion, o r  other paper i s  signed in violation of  this rule. the 
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it ,  a represellled party, or both, an appropriate sanc­
tion, which may include an order to pay to the o ther party or parties the 
amount of  the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of  the 
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
FED. R. CIV. P. II. 
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be dominated by "cosmic anecdotes"4 on one side (costs) and 
confident assertions on the other (benefits). 
We chose not to do so for a variety of reasons. First, it 
seemed important to develop an analytical framework in order to 
determine what data to collect and to formulate hypotheses for 
testing with those data. Second, we were aware that Rule 11 ju­
risprudence is in a dynamic state and that it is developing in dif­
ferent ways in different parts of the country. We thus were aware 
that our empirical data-or rather some of them-would be of 
limited utility in evaluating the Rule in other circuits, and we 
wanted to assist others who might conduct similar studies in 
those circuits. Third, there are a number of important questions 
about Rule 11 that even ambitious empirical work is not likely to 
answer. However, the issues could be illuminated by careful 
analysis and broadly-based conceptual approaches. Too much of 
the existing literature suffers from preoccupation with discrete 
doctrinal questions-for instance, does Rule 1 1  impose a contin­
uing obligation, or is there a duty of mitigation . As a result, 
there is a risk of missing the forest for the trees. We have aimed 
for the forest, aware, but not concerned, that we would miss 
some trees. 
III. NoRMATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
The first half of the report proceeds from our view that both 
the interpretation of amended Rule 1 1  and practice under it are 
likely to be affected, if not driven, by alternative normative per­
spectives-alternative purposes or goals that those invoking or 
applying the amended Rule impute to it, including deterrence, 
punishment, professional responsibility and compensation. 
We start with a fairly traditional, although rigorous, analysis 
of the Rule's language and drafting history, with particular atten­
tion devoted to the Advisory Committee Note. Our conclusion is 
that the goal of the amended Rule is to deter abuse of the civil 
litigation process through the detection and punishment (or dis­
cipline) of violators. Compensation is merely a subsidiary objec­
tive that may, but need not, be furthered through the choice of 
sanctions and should be so pursued only to the extent that it can 
be consistently with the goal of deterrence. Similarly, profes­
sional responsibility is not a goal of the Rule, although the 
-1 A. MILLER, THE AuGusT 1983 AME:-JDI>lENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CrviL 
PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE \1AN,\GH1ENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 
I I  (1984). 
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rulemakers did hope to curb specific professional abuses by de­
fining more precisely the duties of a lawyer who signs a paper 
filed in federal district court. 
Recognizing that this view of the Rule's language and draft­
ing history is not shared by all commentators or courts and that 
the Rule has proved to be an irresistible invitation to some of 
both to pursue their own normative preferences, we consider at 
length the effect of the alternatives on the interpretation and im­
plementation of the Rule. 
/:I. The Rule's Certification Standard 
As we discuss, the so-called "frivolousness" clause of Rule 
1 1  's certification standard focuses on the conduct of the person 
signing the paper that is filed. It would appear to require reason­
able inquiry into the facts and the law and a good faith (honest) 
conclusion based on such inquiry that the paper is "well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law. "5 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 also focuses on 
conduct.G 
Most courts, however, have interpreted this language to im­
pose not just a duty of objectively reasonable inquiry and reflec­
tion on the results of that inquiry but also a duty of objectively 
reasonable conclusions.' In the Task Force's view, this supposed 
requirement of reasonable conclusions is not supported by the 
language of the Rule or the Advisory Committee Note . More im­
portant, focusing on product (is the paper frivolous?) holds little 
promise of advancing the goal of deterrence (specific or general), 
or of upgrading the legal profession. It does, however, provide 
maximum scope for fee-shifting if that is the judge's goal. Deci­
sions imposing Rule 11 sanctions for signing a frivolous paper 
are likely to tell the signer-and others-little that is useful in 
avoiding future violations. The resulting unpredictability can 
lead to over-deterrence, the kind of chilling effect that concerned 
both critics of proposals to amend the Rule and the Advisory 
5 FED. R. CI\'. P. 1 1. 
ti "The new language stresses the need for some prcfiling mquirv illlo both the 
facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative dutv imposecllw the rule. The standard is 
one of reasonableness under the circumstances." FED. R. Cr\·. P. ll advisorv com-
mittee note. 
7 See, e.g., East way Const. Co. v. Citv of New York. 762 F.:!cl 2-!3, 25-± (2d Cir. 
198:}); Zaldivar \'. City of Los "-\ngeles, 780 F.2d 323, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986). 
1 J 
l ; 
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Committee.8 
In the hard case where the lawyer has done a reasonable job 
of investigating the facts and researching the law and has reached 
an honest conclusion that the paper is "well grounded, etc. ," to 
impose Rule 1 1  sanctions is to define as an "abuse" disagree­
ment about the significance of the facts or the tenor of the law. 
We question whether Rule 1 1  is an appropriate, let alone the 
best, way of dealing with professional incompetence that is not 
deterrable .9  
The report's dichotomy between conduct and product is 
drawn more sharply than the case law supports. Many courts fol­
low both approaches, sometimes in the same case. Others use 
product as a basis for inference about conduct. The Task Force 
concluded that drawing the inference is appropriate in many 
cases, so long as a demonstration that the Rule's stated require­
ments were met suffices to defeat the imposition of sanctions for 
a product that the court regards as frivolous. Moreover, when a 
court is engaging in a process of inference, it should so state, 
making clear that the person sanctioned has failed to rebut the 
inference. 
The report does not devote much attention to the Rule's 
"improper purpose" clause. 10 The Task Force does, however, 
question the approach taken by some courts, which would insu­
late from sanctions a complaint that satisfies the "frivolousness 
clause," no matter '.vhat purpose animated its filing. 11 
B. Procedure 
The Advisory Committee was concerned about the costs of 
litigating and adjudicating Rule 11 issues-so-called satellite liti­
gation-and in their Note to the amended Rule encouraged pro­
cedural minimalism. The Committee recognized, of course, the 
8 A product approach need not have this result, if, as in the Third Circuit, trial 
judges arc instructed that Rule II sanctions are reserved for "exceptional circum­
stances." SPP, rg . .  Gaiardo \.Ethyl Corp., 83:) F.:?d -±79, 483 (3d Cir. 1987) How­
ever. as indicated in the text, results (sanctions vs. no sanctions) are not the onlv 
basis for choosing an approach. and a conduct approach is more Iikelv to advance 
the goal of deterrence (without over-deterrence) and to promote professional re­
sponsibility than is a product approach. 
'J CJ. Doering v. Union County Bel. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191. 196 
n.-1 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Other proceedings such as disbarment exist to weed out in­
compccent lawvcrs. Rule 11 was not [promulgated] for this purpose. but rather to 
prO\'ide deterrence for abuses of the svstem of litigation in federal district courts."). 
I O Ste supro note 2. 
I I  Sef', l:'.g . . Zaldic•ar, 780 F.2d at S31-3?. 
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obligation to provide due process. 1 2 
One of the advantages of an approach to Rule 1 1  's certifica­
tion standard that focuses on the paper (product) is its apparent 
amenability to procedural minimalism. The judge, after all, 
knows a frivolous paper when she sees it, particularly if the Rule 
1 1  issue is reached after adjudication on the merits. A hearing 
would, as Judge Posner stated in the context of Appellate Rule 
38, be "pointless."13 Procedural minimalism may also, and inde­
pendently, be encouraged by a compensation perspective, on the 
view that expense-shifting sanctions are only money. 
The Task Force rejects the notion that judges are infallible 
even when the question is frivolousness. We found evidence that 
monetary sanctions are not regarded as "only money" by those 
upon whom such sanctions are imposed. We concluded that the 
Constitution requires prior notice and opportunity to be heard in 
almost all cases under Rule 1 1 . 
Apart from the requirements of due process, neither the 
goal of deterrence nor the perspective of professional responsi­
bility is well served by procedural minimalism. Deterrence re­
quires that both the court and the violator (as well as others who 
pay attention to sanction decisions) understand what went 
wrong. Dialogue may be necessary. Moreover, dialogue is neces­
sary if the judge is to tailor the sanction to the facts . Perhaps the 
dominance of expense-shifting sanctions in reported cases and in 
the cases in our sanction survey reflects in part a conscious or 
unconscious desire to avoid the costs of dialogue. 
The Task Force also rejects the view that a motion for recon­
sideration is an adequate substitute for prior notice and opportu­
nity to be heard. For purposes of constitutional law, we found no 
exceptional circumstances of the sort that are required for such a 
12 The Advis o ry Comm ittee explained: 
The procedure obvious ly  m u s t  comport wi th due p rocess requi rements .  
The part icular format to be fol l owed should depend on t h e  c ircum­
stances of the s i tuat ion and the severity of the sanction u nder con sidera­
tion. In many s i tuat ions the judge's part ic ipation in the proceedings 
p rovides him wi th full knowl edge of the relevant facts  and l i t t le further 
inquiry wil l  be necessary. 
To assure that  the efficiencies achieved th rough more effec tive op­
erat ion of the p l eading regimen w i l l  not  be offset by the cost  of sate l l i te 
l i t igat ion over the imposi t ion of sanct ions ,  the court must to the ext e n t  
poss ib le l i m i t  the scope o f  sanction proceedings to t h e  record. Thus, 
discovery should be conducted o n lv by leave o f  the court ,  and t hen only 
i n  ext raordinary c ircumstances. 
FED. R. Cl\'. P. I 1 advisory com m ittee note. 
1 3 Hil l  v. i\!orfolk & Western Ry .. 814 F.2d 1192, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) 
1989] R ULE 11 517 
procedure.14 Moreover, we were concerned about the effects of a 
sanction-first-ask-questions-later approach on lawyers' attitudes, 
and hence on clients' attitudes, towards the civil justice system. 
Finally, we have evidence that, even on a narrow definition of 
costs, the procedure may not be efficient, spawning elaborate 
proceedings on reconsideration and, perhaps, appeals. 
Indeed, on the same narrow view of costs the apparent effi­
ciency of a product approach and/or of a compensatory perspec­
tive may be a mirage. Frivolousness is in the eye of the beholder, 
and the prospect of attorney's fees for a successful Rule 1 1  mo­
tion may be hard to resist.15 Both a product approach 16 and a 
compensatory perspective can encourage such motions. More­
over, a compensatory perspective encourages the imputation of 
rights to a party making a Rule 1 1  motion, including the right to 
an explanation when the motion is denied.17 Finally, a product 
approach may be thought to entail de novo appellate review18 and 
hence lead to more appeals. 
The prior "hearing" required need not in most cases be an 
evidentiary hearing. Most Rule 11 issues (66.4 % )  in our sanction 
survey were resolved, as they should have been resolved, on the 
papers. Oral argument is appropriate in some cases, particularly 
when the papers incline the judge to believe that a violation may 
have occurred. 
The Task Force rejects the notion that a party making a Rule 
1 1  motion has any rights except the right to conscientious atten­
tion to the requirements of the Rule by the trial judge. We rec­
ommend that trial judges deny perfunctory Rule 11 motions 
without awaiting a response and that they need not explain the 
denial of such a motion. The imposition of Rule 1 1  sanctions, on 
the other hand, requires explanation, which may also be im­
portant from deterrence and professional responsibility 
pers pectl ves . 
1-l See FDIC v. i\Iallen, I 08 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 ( 1988) (a certain limited class of 
cases demand prompt action). 
1 "> C/ Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, J 540 (9th 
Cir. 1986) ("In even a close case, \'-"·e think it cxtremelv unlikely th at a judge, who 
has already decided that the Ia\'' is not as a lawyer argued it, will also decide that the 
loser's position was warranted bv existing law."). 
I !i But see sujJra note 8. 
1 7  See, e.g., Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp .. 823 F.2d 1073, 1083-84 
(7th Cir. i987). cert. disnn.1Jed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988). 
IH See, eg, Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986). 
"' 
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C. Sanctions 
The Task Force takes the position that the sanction imposed 
for a violation of Rule 1 1  should be the least severe sanction that 
will achieve the purpose of specific deterrence. 19 Routine resort 
to expense-shifting sanctions is inconsistent with the exercise of 
discretion contemplated by the Rule.20 Additionally, in many 
cases, expense-shifting sanctions on an attorney's fee model will 
be heavier or lighter than deterrence requires. Moreover, the at­
torney's fee model brings with it a complicated jurisprudence2 1 
that can only increase the costs of satellite litigation. Again, how­
ever, it is perfectly appropriate for a court to impose an expense­
shifting sanction (not necessarily full expense-shifting), if that 
will advance the goal of specific deterrence and is otherwise indi­
cated by consideration of the equities, including such matters as 
the violator's ability to pay.22 
The Task Force proposes a presumptive rule that Rule 1 1  
sanctions be imposed on the lawyer who signs the paper found to 
be in violation. The proposed presumptive rule has the advan­
tage of reducing procedural costs, in particular the occasions for 
evidentiary hearings to allocate responsibility between lawyer 
and client. More important, it should mitigate the problem of 
conflict of interest for the lawyer faced with a Rule 1 1  motion or 
show cause order and, as well, the problem of official invasion of 
a confidential relationship. The proposed presumptive rule will 
not, however, eliminate conflicts or the possibility of overreach­
ing. As to the latter, the Task Force believes it appropriate for a 
court to forbid a lawyer vvhose primary responsibility is clear 
from collecting a monetary sanction from the client. As to the 
former, the question is one of comparative costs. To date, most 
courts have simply ignored conflict problems. A few recent deci­
sions suggest that they can no longer do so.:z3 Finally, the pro­
posed presumptive rule is hardly ideal from the point of view of 
1�) ."lccord, e.g . . Thomas v. Capitai Sec. Serv., Inc. 8 3 6 F.2d 8 6 6, 8 8 3 (5th Cir. 
1 98 8) (en bane); Doering v. Union Countv Bd. of Chosen Freeholders. 857 F.2d 
19 1,  1 9 4 (3d Cir. 1988). 
:zo The Advisory Commiuee exphined that "[t]he court . . . retains the nccessarv 
flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It has the discretion to 
tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case." FED. R. C1v. P. I I  advisorv 
commiuee note. 
:21 See, e.g., East way Con st. Corp. \. City of New York, 82 1 F .2d 1 21 ,  1 24-:25 (2d 
Cir. 1 987) (Pratt, J. , dissenting) . 
:2:2 Ser Doering, 857 F.2d at 1 9-1-97. 
�:-1 Sef !n re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 985 (6th Cir. 1987), art. de111fd, I 08 S. Ct. ll 08 
( 1988); Calloway v. klar\'el Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1456 (2d Cir.), 
1 989] R ULE II 519 
deterrence. But neither, of course, is a system that allocates with­
out inquiry. 
D. Appellate Review 
The Task Force favors a unitary and deferential standard of 
appellate review pursuant to which all Rule 1 1  determinations 
would be reviewed for abuse of discretion.24 Such a standard re­
spects the fact that the trial judge "has tasted the flavor of the 
litigation"25 and that the question of sanctions is a matter of 
"judgment and degree."26 It also is less likely to stimulate ap­
peals-satellite litigation in another orbit-than a standard which 
treats the question of violation as a legal question, reviewable de 
novo. The latter, of course, is a standard encouraged by a prod­
uct approach. If a trial judge knows a frivolous paper when she 
sees it, so too do the judges on the court of appeals . 
Three courts of appeals have held or suggested that ex­
penses of appeal are available for defending a Rule 1 1  sanction 
successfully and/ or for successfully challenging a denial of Rule 
1 1  sanctions.27 The Task Force rejects such a rule, finding 
mandatory expenses inconsistent with the Rule's grant of discre­
tion to the trial judge to fashion an appropriate sanction211 and 
discretionary expenses too great a threat to the exercise of a stat­
utory right. 29 Expenses for challenging a denial will encourage 
appeals, and both rules are of doubtful validity, either because 
they conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 1 912 and Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 38 or because they turn Rule 1 1  into a fee-shifting 
Rule in violation of the Rules Enabling Act. '10 Finally, the data 
cerl. granted sub 110111. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 109 S. Ct. 
1116 ( 1988) 
2-1 .-lccord, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc., 841 F.2d 
G6. 68 (3d Cir. 1988), rer/. demed, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988); Thomas v. Capital Sec. 
Sen., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871-73 (Sth Cir. 1988) (en bane). But 5ee, e.g., Zaldivar v. 
Citv of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986); Westmoreland v. C BS, Inc., 
770 F.2cl 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
:.>'i fl'es/more{and, 770 F.2d at 1174. 
:.>ti O'Connell v. Champion Int'l C or p ., 812 F.2cl 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987). 
:.>7 See Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 84 7 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988); Muthig 
v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc. , 838 F.2d 600. 607 ( l st Cir. 1988); Jl'es/111oreland, 770 
F.2d at ! 179-80. See also S.A. Auto Lube, Inc. v. JifTv Lube Int'l, Inc., 842 F.2d 94G, 
950-5 I (7th Cir. 1988). 
:.>H Sec .\lljJm note 20. 
:.>'I CJ \Yebst cr v. Sowders, 84() F.2d l 032. I 040 (Gth Cir. 1988) ("Appeals of 
district court orders should not he deterred b,· threats f of Rule I I  sanctions] from 
district judges."). 
:w See Gaiar clo v. Ethyl Corp , 835 F.2cl 4/�J. 483 (3d Cir. 1987). 
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from our appellate survey do not support the argument that ex­
penses for successfully defending a monetary Rule 1 1  sanction 
are necessary to secure the participation on appeal of the party to 
whom the sanction was awarded by the district court. 
IV. EXPERIENCE UNDER RULE 1 1  
The Task Force's empirical studies permit us to shed light 
on questions that have been raised, and assertions that have been 
made, about Rule 1 1  in judicial opinions and in the literature. 
Some of our findings are of considerable interest nationally; 
others are of limited utility outside the Third Circuit. 
A. Findings of National Interest 
1 .  The Unreliability of Statistics Based on Reported 
Cases 
By comparing the data from our sanction survey with data 
available from published opinions and computerized data banks, 
we were able to confirm the suspicion that available opinions rep­
resent the tip of the iceberg. Published decisions account for 
only 9. 1 %  of Rule 1 1  dispositions in our survey and LEXIS for 
only 39. 1 %. Moreover, published decisions suggest a ratio of 
sanctions to cases (40 % )  far higher than the actual ratio ( 1 9.8 % ). 
In addition, statistics based on reported decisions cannot 
capture informal adjustments of Rule 1 1  issues, the role that 
Rule 1 1  plays in the settlement or voluntary dismissal of cases, or 
the role that warnings under Rule 1 1  play in advancing the goal 
of deterrence. Twenty-two of the 1 32 Rule 1 1  motions in our 
sanction survey were settled, withdrawn, resolved as part of the 
settlement or dismissal of the case or otherwise mooted. We 
know that in some cases a price was paid for settlement or with­
drawal of the motion and that in others it played a causal role in 
the termination of the case. We also know that about 50 % of the 
district judges responding to our questionnaire warn about pos­
sible Rule 1 1  violations and that the great majority of them be­
lieve that these warnings are effective. 
2. Rule 1 1  Motions are Neither a Cottage Industry Nor 
an Urban Phenomenon in the Third Circuit 
We found, on the basis of our sanction survey, that Rule 1 1  
motions were made in only approximately 1 /2 of one percent of 
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30, 1 988). Although it would be a mistake to extrapolate from 
this finding to activity in other circuits, it should cause some 
change in the rhetoric of the debate. More important, we hope 
that our work will prompt further inquiry into the causes of high 
or low rates of activity. 
The Task Force suggests that contributing factors to high or 
low rates of Rule 1 1  activity may include local legal culture (e.g., 
general attitudes towards sanctions and cooperation and collegi­
ality), doctrine, and individual judicial attitudes towards Rule 1 1  
sanctions as a case management device. Local legal culture, and 
in particular the infiltration of New York's legal culture, seems to 
play a part in the relatively high level of activity in New Jersey.31 
Individual attitudes towards Rule 1 1  as a case-management de­
vice may help to explain the very high sanctioning rate in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania.32 In any event, the Task Force 
does not find urbanism a powerful explanatory concept in this 
context. 
3. The Impact of Rule 1 1  on Plaintiffs and on Civil 
Rights Plaintiffs 
The Task Force's findings confirm conclusions based on re­
ported decisions that the Rule has disproportionate impacts on 
all plaintiffs and on civil rights plaintiffs in particular. Although 
our findings are less striking than those previously published, 
they are nonetheless cause for further inquiry. 
Plaintiffs (and/or their counsel) were the targets of approxi­
mately two-thirds of the Rule 1 1  motions in our sanction survey, 
and they were sanctioned at a rate ( 1 5.9 % )  higher than the rate 
for defendants (9. 1 %). Moreover, plaintiffs were the object of 
77.8 % of all sanctions imposed, on motion and sua sponte, in the 
survey period. 
The Task Force regards this differential impact as wholly 
predictable. Rule l2(a), providing 20 days for a defendant to file 
an answer,33 creates circumstances in every case akin to the limi­
tations time bind facing some plaintiffs. Complaints are thus, a 
:11 The District of New Jersey accounted for forty-three of 132 Rule I I  motions 
during the survey period. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania had the next high­
est level of activity, forty-two requests. 
:1:.> The disti·ict judges in the Middle District of Pennsylvania imposed sanctions. 
on motion, at a rate (9nO or 45;7o) far higher than that of the next highest district 
(New Jersey- 8/36 or 22.2%). 
:u The Rule provides: 
DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS-WHEN AND HOW PRESENTED-
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priori, more likely targets than answers,34 and where expense­
shifting sanctions are the norm, they may be an irresistible target, 
at least for lawyers whose clients will pay for the motion. Contin­
gency contracts are predominantly for plaintiffs, and contingent­
fee lawyers have special reason to file Rule 11 motions only when 
they are cost-justified. 
Civil rights cases did not loom as large in our sanction sur­
vey as in the statistics based on reported decisions. Yet, civil 
rights plaintiffs and/or their lawyers were sanctioned at a rate 
(47.1%) far higher than plaintiffs as a whole (15.9%) and higher 
still than plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8.45%). The same 
was true of counselled civil rights plaintiffs. 35 
The Task Force regards these findings as a matter for seri­
ous concern, and we have only begun the search for possible ex­
planations. In aid of that process, we suggest that it may be 
useful to break down the category of "civil rights" cases, as by 
discretely considering prisoner cases, pro se cases and section 
BY PLEADING OR MOTION-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS 
(a)  When Presented. A defendant shall  serve an answer within 20 davs 
after the service of the summons and complaint upon that defenda�t, 
except when service is made under Rule 4 (e) and a different time is pre­
scribed in the order of court under the statute of the United States or in 
the statute or rule of court of the state. A party served with a pleading 
stating a cross-claim against that party shall  serve an answer thereto 
within 20 days after the service upon that party. The plaintiff shall serve 
a reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service of 
the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within 20 days after 
service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The United 
States or an officer or agency thereof shall  serve an answer to the com­
plaint or to a cross-claim, or a reply to a counterclaim, within 60 days 
after the service upon the United States attorney of the pleading in 
which the claim is asserted. The service of a motion permitted under 
this rule alters these periods of time as fol lows, unless a different tim e  is 
fixed by order of the court: ( I )  if the court denies the motion or 
postpones its disposition umil the trial on the merits, the responsive 
pleading shall  be served within l 0 days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement the respon­
sive pleading shall be served within I 0 days after the service of the more 
definite statement. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 12 (a). 
34 Complaints were the target of 50% of the motions for sanctions and sua 
sponte impositions during the survey period. By contrast. answers accounted for 
only 5 .3%, and answers and Rule l2 (b )  motions to dismiss together for only 
12.1 %. of the motions. 
'\5 Counselled civil rights plaintiffs were sanctioned on motion at a rate (-!5.5;7o) 
far higher than the rate for counselied plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8. 7 '1o) .  
The findings of disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs and counselled 
civil rights plaintiffs are statistically significant at a !eYe! of less than l;?'o. 
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1 983 actions. Moreover, we regard section 1 983 actions as par­
ticularly ill-suited for a product approach to Rule 1 1 , because the 
law under section 1 983 is particularly "underdeterminate,"36 and 
for a compensatory perspective, because expense-shifting sanc­
tions pose a special risk of overdeterrence in this context. 
B. Findings of i\l!ore Limited Utility 
The Task Force recognizes that some critics of Rule 1 1  will 
be alarmed by its findings and conclusions about the benefits and 
costs of the Rule in the Third Circuit37 and that some supporters 
of the Rule will take those findings and conclusions as proof that 
they were right all along. Both groups should recognize that 
there is no bottom line in the report and should heed our cau­
tions that any such assessment ( 1 )  is hardly the product of exact 
science and (2) cannot, or at least should not, be exported to 
other circuits. We know that the law is developing in different 
ways in different parts of the country and that, apart from doc­
trine, judicial attitudes towards the Rule differ, as do local legal 
cultures. In considering the benefits and costs of the Rule in the 
Third Circuit, it is important to take account of attitudes towards 
sanctions in general and towards collegiality and of the re­
strained approach to the Rule that has been encouraged by our 
court of appeals. 
The Task Force found evidence of quite widespread effects 
on conduct of the sort hoped for by the rulemakers. Some 
43.5 % of those responding to our questionnaire reported an ef­
fect on pre-filing factual inquiry; 34 . 5 %  saw impact on pre-filing 
legal inquiry, and 22. 1 %  experienced an effect on their practice 
in counselling clients not to file a complaint. I t  is obvious from 
the comments and from our attorney interviews that many law­
yers in this circuit are more careful as a result of amended Rule 
:Hi Solum.  On the lndetenn znacy Cmzs: Cntiquing Critical Dogma , 5-t U. C H I .  L. REv.  
4 6 2 ,  4 73 ( I 98 7 ) .  SeP C i t v  of S t .  Lou i s  v .  Praprotnik ,  1 08 S .  C t .  9 1 5 , 9 2 2  ( 1 98 8 ) . 
:17 The report concludes:  
( I )  Rul e  l l  is n o t  a cottage industrv ,  and Rule  I I  motions are not  rou­
t ine,  i n  the Third Circui t ;  (2)  Rule I I  has had effects on the p re-fi l i n g  
c o n d u c t  of m a n y  attorneys in  t h i s  c ircui t  of the sort h o p e d  for by t h e  
rulemakers and h a s  yielded o ther  benefi t s ;  ( 3 )  the c o s t s  direct ly  associ­
a ted w1th Rule  I I  ' s  effects on conduct here do not  ap pear to b e  clearlv 
incommens urate wi th  the probable benefits  accruing from those effects ;  
and (4 ) other cos ts  are not  presen t ly .  b u t  mav soon be,  a source of seri­
ous concern. 
R U L E  1 1  IN TR.\ N S ITI O N ,  supra note  3. at 95. 
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1 1  and that many view the changes in their practice with 
satisfaction. 
We also found evidence of benefits in connection with the 
settlement or dismissal of cases, and in the perceived effective­
ness of warnings by judges issuing them. Both effects, however, 
require careful evaluation because of the danger of unjustified 
coercwn. 
The major costs of Rule 1 1  focused on by its critics are the 
costs of satellite litigation. Various data from our empirical s tud­
ies led us to conclude that, in the Third Circuit, these cos ts are 
not clearly incommensurate with the Rule's probable benefits. 
Lawyers do not seem to be spending a great deal of time on Rule 
1 1  motions, particularly those that are denied, and neither the 
procedures used nor the modes of disposition in the cases in our 
sanction survey suggest an undue burden on dis trict courts. Sin­
gle-issue Rule 1 1  appeals are, on the other hand, quite expen­
sive, but we expect the incidence of such appeals-which were 
not numerous in our one year survey period-to decline . 
The Task Force was also unable to conclude, on the basis of 
the available data, that the collateral costs of Rule 1 1  are pres­
ently a serious concern in the Third Circuit, al though we are wor­
ried that some of them may soon be. Only approximately one­
quarter of the respondents to our attorney ques tionnaire per­
ceived that the amended Rule has chilled legal development, and 
in the same group of respondents only 5 %  reported an effect on 
their practice in seeking extension or change in the law. 3H Nor 
does it appear that the amended Rule has poisoned relations be­
tween lawyers and clients or lawyers and judges ,  although it has 
had a s tronger negative effect on lawyer-lawyer relations.'3�) 
Our initial inquiries suggest, however, that the Rule may 
soon have an effect on malpractice insurance availability or rates 
that should raise considerable concern, and its impact on bar dis­
cipline and other professional aspects deserves further s tudy. 
Pending such study, we believe courts imposing Rule 1 1  sanc­
tions should consider possible collateral consequences and err 
on the side of not causing them to be incurred . 
:Hl A number of part icipan t s  at the Third C i rc u i t  Judicia l  C o n ference regarded 
this finding as  cause for concern , point ing out that in that group might be those 
lawyers who were previously  most  d isposed and best  equipped to  expand our l egal 
horizons. 
' )9 Agai n ,  t here were those at  the Third Circuit  .J udicial  Conference ,,·ho decried 
the " corros ive" effects o f  the amended Rule. 
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V. CONCLUS ION 
Amended Rule 1 1  was an experiment. It probably took too 
little time to conceive-certainly it was based on virtually no em­
pirical data."10 It will require a good deal of time to implement 
and to evaluate. The Task Force's work is an attempt to substi­
tute facts for speculation. The report provides no definitive an­
swers . We need more facts. If our work stimulates further 
studies,41 I shall consider it a great success. 
-10 See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 
1 1 ,  137 U. PA. L .  REV. 1925,  1 92 7  ( 1 989). 
-I I The Task Force's firs t  recommendation i s  that " [a )  s imilar s tudy should be 
undertaken in a circui t  with a d ifferent reputation regarding, and (as evidenced by 
case law) different normative perspectives on,  Rule I I  sanctions ."  RuLE I I  IN 
TRANSITION, supra note t .  I have personal ly nominated the Seventh Circui t  for such 
a study. See Burbank, supra note 40, at  1957-58.  
